Monthly Archives: November 2006

THINKING ISN’T FREE

More on the folk religion tip: the folk religion in this case being ‘free thinking’.

Years ago when Judith and I started out by giving experiential workshops on transformative learning to the local noetics group, on several occasions during the debrief I entertained inquiries from participants who described themselves as “free thinkers”. I’m thinking of two particular occasions and each was revelatory, at least was so, if you’re an ironist as I am.

In both cases the participant needed help understanding how a procedure oriented around intuition worked. Actually, as it turned out, they needed help understanding how the process could even exist.

Participant: It seems to me what you do is provide learners with lots of data and the learner makes associations and connects associations up with what they think are insights. Right?

Stephen: That’s a good way to describe it.

Participant: Okay, so I don’t understand why this isn’t anything more than something like brainstorming.

Stephen: It’s like that.

Participant: But if you call it transformative and say it is intuitive too, then I don’t understand how it works.

Stephen: But you just described how it works.

Participant: I saw it work but I don’t understand how it works.

Flummoxed was he.

On several occasions our explanation of the procedure struck participants as abstract whereas for them to go through the process made the introductory conceptions concrete. But, for some personality types this very concreteness seemed to them question begging. The main question could be: is there an experience commensurate with the explanation?

As I mentioned before, psychologizing is, for many free thinking types, a very strange mode of explanation. I guess, it’s not ‘propositional’ enough, is not nomothetic. But, oddly, this can introduce a skepticism about the experience itself. I don’t mean here to over-determine the personality types of free thinkers in general.

Well, free thinkers like to argue and, since I know well, for example, the history of the mind/body problem, and, furthermore, know and understand what are the unresolved meta-problems and problems of philosophy, (especially when it is reflexive,) I also know how to probe–for at least the sake of amusement–promoters of the religion of free thinking. After all, since much that is unresolved is, for them, settled, and because reflecting about their own (higher) orders of (personal) heuristics is anxiety provoking, I sustain significant advantages in any argument.

I don’t even have to unholster my post-modernism! My actual sample is fairly small yet I’ve never encountered a free thinker who hadn’t solved the mind/body problem in some way or the other.

On est obligé d’ailleurs de confesser que la Perception et ce qui en dépend, est inexplicable par des raisons mécaniques, c’est-à-dire par les figures et par les mouvements.

It must be confessed that perception and that which depends upon it are inexplicable on mechanical grounds, that is to say, by means of figures and motions.

Liebniz

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WHIRL

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MAC AHEAD

Susan received her refurb MacBook today. She saved $200 on, literally, last week’s Core Duo lineup, now that Apple has bumped the nifty notebooks to Core Duo 2. Well, once again, she’s got the faster computer after 8 years in the bridesmaid spot. (She might add here, ‘You’re still married to your Mac.’) Me? My sound designing demands an OS9 machine so my Mirror Door dual 1.25ghz isn’t headed upstairs into the Apple Museum (5 oldies stored there including an original Macintosh,) yet it does seem a MacBook Pro would restore my honor.

The MacBook, as many who don’t know, need to know, is about the sleekest bundle of software and hardware integration ever achieved in its form factor at its price, ($1,099 for the new white ones). Still, I really have no reason to, say, borrow her machine, except for. . .

iBooth. There’s a camera embedded in the upper edge of the screen’s frame. Neat.

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TO BELIEVE OR NOT TO BE

Richard Dawkins. The God Delusion. Harrumph.

Dawkins is aggravated at magical precepts and objects of belief. Moreover, as many are, he finds the religious game of king of the hill destructive. But, Dawkins is somehow prevented by the mote in his eye from realizing that faith, belief, are completely normal features of the consciousness the most sentient of creatures use to navigate a world not configured to yield ‘scientific’ results in each and every case.

Were we to break down our choicemaking day in and day out and drill into our cognitive complexity, into our consciousness, we’d soon, immediately discover, that the terms of our navigation are largely funded by belief. And faith. In dumb little stuff. We believe we’ve picked the best tomato from the pile. We’re pragmatists and the core proposition underlying the utility of almost all our sundry suppositions is that we believe that they are true.

This is lost on Dawkins. In a post to follow I’ll tell of my several encounters with free thinkers, methodological materialists, and various “Brights”. Every single one is united by their shared discomfort with psychologizing and psychology. And, they’re united by their unreasonable faith that their findings per force apply to moi because “it is just so”.

Terry Eagleton. Lunging, Flailing, Mispunching (London Review of Books; Oct.19, 2006)

Dawkins’s Supreme Being is the God of those who seek to avert divine wrath by sacrificing animals, being choosy in their diet and being impeccably well behaved. They cannot accept the scandal that God loves them just as they are, in all their moral shabbiness. This is one reason St Paul remarks that the law is cursed. Dawkins sees Christianity in terms of a narrowly legalistic notion of atonement – of a brutally vindictive God sacrificing his own child in recompense for being offended – and describes the belief as vicious and obnoxious. It’s a safe bet that the Archbishop of Canterbury couldn’t agree more. It was the imperial Roman state, not God, that murdered Jesus.

Gary Wolf. The Church of the Non-Believers (Wired Magazine; Nov. 14, 2006)

The New Atheists have castigated fundamentalism and branded even the mildest religious liberals as enablers of a vengeful mob. Everybody who does not join them is an ally of the Taliban. But, so far, their provocation has failed to take hold. Given all the religious trauma in the world, I take this as good news. Even those of us who sympathize intellectually have good reasons to wish that the New Atheists continue to seem absurd. If we reject their polemics, if we continue to have respectful conversations even about things we find ridiculous, this doesn’t necessarily mean we’ve lost our convictions or our sanity. It simply reflects our deepest, democratic values. Or, you might say, our bedrock faith: the faith that no matter how confident we are in our beliefs, there’s always a chance we could turn out to be wrong.

Of course, as artifice, considered from the grids of sociology and anthropology, (thus: as history,) religion, and various human instantiations of vast systems for principled organizing are interesting far beyond their arrayed assumptions. Utility, again…

Thomas Nagel. The Fear of Religion (The New Republic; Oct. 23, 2006; avail. EBSCO)

I also think that there is no reason to undertake the project in the first place. We have more than one form of understanding. Different forms of understanding are needed for different kinds of subject matter. The great achievements of physical science do not make it capable of encompassing everything, from mathematics to ethics to the experiences of a living animal. We have no reason to dismiss moral reasoning, introspection, or conceptual analysis as ways of discovering the truth just because they are not physics.

Any anti-reductionist view leaves us with very serious problems about how the mutually irreducible types of truths about the world are related. At least part of the truth about us is that we are physical organisms composed of ordinary chemical elements. If thinking, feeling, and valuing aren’t merely complicated physical states of the organism, what are they? What is their relation to the brain processes on which they seem to depend? More: if evolution is a purely physical causal process, how can it have brought into existence conscious beings?

A religious worldview is only one response to the conviction that the physical description of the world is incomplete. Dawkins says with some justice that the will of God provides a too easy explanation of anything we cannot otherwise understand, and therefore brings inquiry to a stop. Religion need not have this effect, but it can. It would be more reasonable, in my estimation, to admit that we do not now have the understanding or the knowledge on which to base a comprehensive theory of reality.

Dawkins seems to believe that if people could be persuaded to give up the God Hypothesis on scientific grounds, the world would be a better place– not just intellectually, but also morally and politically. He is horrified–as who cannot be?–by the dreadful things that continue to be done in the name of religion, and he argues that the sort of religious conviction that includes a built-in resistance to reason is the true motive behind many of them. But there is no connection between the fascinating philosophical and scientific questions posed by the argument from design and the attacks of September 11. Blind faith and the authority of dogma are dangerous; the view that we can make ultimate sense of the world only by understanding it as the expression of mind or purpose is not. It is unreasonable to think that one must refute the second in order to resist the first.

When anybody assumes that their universal theism or scientism applies to me–too–and offers as proof, “it is just so,” then I might be inclined to point out the obvious problem of presumption. On the other hand, it’s amazing to me, to this day, that many sophisticated believers haven’t given any thought to the ramifications of their universalizing beliefs.

This is aside from how unsympathetic I personally am to magical belief systems, chains of being, anthropomorphic or deistic personification, and, especially, to the concept of a godly ‘dude’ who sits at some holy control panel messing with human affairs. But, each to their own even if many can’t grok the deal via which god doesn’t mess with me and I don’t mess with god.

Incidentally, after thirty years of meditation and contemplation, it’s enough to reveal out of my own spiritual affair, that my hope for myself is that my prejudices, when deployed consciously, disrupt any propensity to do harm. As for my beliefs, I echo John Lilly, “my beliefs are unbelievable!”.

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THOUGHTFUL VOTES

Politics have been offloaded to: Diggeracity. The following remains because it’s about social psychology.

Elections interest me mostly because they’re where the rubbery cognitive complexities hit the pavement. Voter behavior is intriguing. There are no competing social actions at the scale of elections. One way or the other everybody’s individual world view, meaning scheme, folk psychology, folk sociology, personal philosophy, idiosyncratic heuristics, and their version of rationality and/or emotionality are, for a moment, extruded from the sensibility so as to converge on a mark or a touch of the screen.

What are the various reasons voters vote the way they do?

It is a fascinating subject because there are so many different kinds of answers reported to researchers. Anybody who thinks there is a general class of answers into which fall the reports of a rational calculation of policy factors and conclusions, and that this class predominates in voter decision making, would be wrong. It’s much much more complicated and, at times, counter-intuitive than the reduction to a rational calculation of interest could encompass.

One of the consequences of this is that the variety of decision making regimes cannot generally be framed by the most common folk sociological scheme, ideology. This is to say the decision making rarely conforms to the instrumental propositions given by an ideological scheme. Most people are more pragmatic than ideological schemes warrant. (For example, most people haven’t thought about whether they are optimistic or pessimistic abut human nature. Or:they haven’t thought about whether knowing their right place in a natural order is important.) So, their decision making isn’t usually a case of referring to what an idealized conservative or liberal does or would do.

This is commonsense. Vote deciding is context-sensitive and deciders will be ‘plastic,’ flexible, oft able to diverge away from inflexible assumptions and converge upon the assumptions which fund their self-interest. This self-interest might only implicate the sense, for example, that the favored candidate is the ‘one I’d like to share a beer with.’ This same voter might report to a researcher, “I’m a Republican.” He or she might elaborate a rationale for voting for the Republican, this rationale might fit well with an ideological scheme, but, if the actual reason was a hunch about sharing a beer, it’s easy to see both the null role of ideology, and, the research challenge the eliciting of after-the-fact reasons supposes.

Whereas some people employ a lot of (their) cognitive complexity to decide, others do not. (Each of us carries different toolboxes, so-to-speak.) Yet, at the same time, ideological schemes exist in a “pre-psychological” domain in modern cognitive terms, so, their categorical and classification and constructive schemes do not correlate with actual cognitive constructive schemes, schemes which are instrumental and behavioral; behavioral in the general sense: having to do with an intentional act. Ideological schemes over-generalize and their implicit generalizations do not match with behavioral schemes. Well, they weren’t intended to, but, constantly, we are subject to the false assumption that holds they are one in the same, that ideology is, constructively, found at the core of decision making.

Voters are largely pragmatists and most aren’t concerned with what is either ideologically ‘true’ or subjectively ‘true’ for someone else.

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WHERE IT BEGAN

DailyKos highlights positions taken by Burns & Allen (!) in the aftermath of the Florida Fiasco six years ago.

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KATE TUNES IN

Kate, the cat, watches election returns. She doesn’t, as far as I know, care who wins as long as her caretakers don’t become despondant.

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LONG WARS AND OUR DEMOCRACY

If the election tomorrow is about Iraq, it’s also about a nation of citizen armchair geopolitical strategists making up their minds. Yup, each of us indulges our hunch about the war and for some of us this sense will be decisive. Presumably a vote to sustain Republican majorities in the Congress endorses the continued effort to pacify and re-organize Iraq. I don’t know exactly what a vote for Democrats means with respect to Iraq. They haven’t really weighed in on whether Iraq can be fixed or not, but, nevertheless, it would appear the Democrats are mostly against the neocon fantasy of ruling Iraq for whatever reasons, and, I’m hoping they are against destroying Iraq to save it.

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NATIVE GONE

The anthropologist Clifford Gertz has left us. He’s another of my main guys etched prominently in my own investigations on the heels of Richard Halliburton (a popularizer, read as a twelve year old,) and later Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, Franz Boas, Bronislaw Malinowski, Joseph Campbell, Claude Levi-Straus, Ruth Simpson, Jack Goody, and many others.

One of the key baseline points of cultural anthropology is its synthesis of neutral categories at the same time  the very biases that impinge on the construction of neutrality are carefully factored. I don’t know why today, but this is the reflection that arises when I think of Gertz and the anthropology I favor and am deeply influenced by.

Gertz: Know what he [the anthropologist] thinks a savage is and you have the key to his work. You know what he thinks he himself is and, knowing what he thinks he himself is, you know in general what sort of thing he is going to say about whatever tribe he happens to be studying. All ethnography is part philosophy, and a good deal of the rest is confession. (Interpretation of Cultures)

Geertz wrote a series of articles on Islam over the years for the New York Review of Books. They are timely precisely because he articulates, long before and against the reduction of Islam now fashionable in popular lay interpretations, the extremely rich weave of Islam and its cultural-historical development.

from his review of Hodgson’s The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization, Vol. 1: The Classical Age of Islam, December 11, 1975, NYR:

So Hodgson’s book ends with the end-of-Islam, exce t for its legacy of moral aestheticism. He foresees an Islamle s Islamicate that can coexist, in the modern “technicalistic” world, with the religionless Christianity so popular “in so vieux jeu circles” when Hodgson was writing, and so vieux jeu now in those same circles, which now are fascinated by popular beliefs and festal celebrations. Perhaps such a view is the final outcome of trying to inflate Sufism into a comprehensive interpretative category with neither well-drawn edges nor a well-located center. The diversity of Islamic religious viewpoints remains; Qaddhafi’s desert camp fundamentalism and Sadat’s Cairene eclecticism do as much to divide as connect them. And, though it is not much more attractive to me than it is to Hodgson, the great power of Shariah legalism persists. So too does the diversity of institutions and cultural traditions within Islamdom: the Berbers and Malaysians both regard their sharply different social systems as properly Islamic.

One might be in a better position to understand and evaluate such phenomena if one’s idea of what Islam is and has always been were closer to Wittgenstein’s notion of a “family resemblance.” We think we see striking resemblances between different generations of a family but, as Wittgenstein pointed out, we may find that there is no one feature common to them; the resemblance may come from many different features “overlapping and crisscrossing.” This sort of approach seems more promising than one that sees the history of Islam, as Hodgson’s does, as an extended struggle of a gentle pietism to escape from an arid legalism. A picture of the Islamic venture derived from “overlaps” and “crosscrosses” would be less ordered and less continuous, a matter of oblique connections and glancing contrasts, and general conclusions would be harder to come by. But it could leave us with a history less orchestrated than Hodgson’s, and more immediate.

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Teaching Cartoon: Lessons

Nassruddin tale - Lessons

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